Since its introduction to International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE) in the early 1980s, Gramsci's writings have become an important reference point for scholars interested in bridging the analysis of economic structure and political and ideological superstructures. This common interest has led to a proliferation of neo-Gramscian approaches, with scholars relying on Gramsci to support arguments as disparate as the emergence of a global civil society (Lipschutz 1992) , the prospects of a post-liberal democracy (Golding 1992 ) and the cultural turn in post-colonial theory and subaltern studies (Harris 1993). However, despite the positioning of his work right at the crux where the international and the national, the economic and the political, the material and the ideational meet, Gramsci has rarely been invoked to address the political economy of reforms in the developing world, and more specifically in the Middle East. This is unfortunate for two reasons. Firstly, Gramsci's work allows us to study the consequences of neoliberal economic reforms by still focusing on the conditioning power held by the economic structure and the relations of class forces underlying it, while at the same time avoiding the shallows of deterministic Marxist approaches (Germain and Kenny 1998). Secondly, the suitability of Gramsci's insights to the study of the political economy of the Middle East has been seriously underexploited. In the past decades, Gramsci has increasingly been called upon to discuss specific elements of the international relations of the Middle East, ranging from the US foreign policy towards Iraq and its relation to state autonomy (Dodge 2006) , to the reproduction of cultures and identities in Egypt as an obstacle to meaningful democratisation (Pratt 2005) . Despite these valuable contributions, to my knowledge the only systematic attempt to develop a Gramscian framework for analysing the political economy of the region came from Nazih Ayubi (1995). However, the explicit focus on the regional dimension of his study means that little attention was paid to the international dimension, both with respect to the globalising tendencies of capital accumulation and to the specific policies adopted by social groups and institutions active on the international scale. Yet, Gramsci's peculiar biography, with a childhood in then underdeveloped Sardinia followed by university studies in Turin, one of the outposts of European industrial capitalism in the early twentieth century, suggests that he might have something to tell us about how developed and developing countries interact with each other, and what are the social relations mobilised by these interactions.
